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Abstract  
Unconditional cash transfers are the key social protection strategy in low- and middle-income 
countries. However, the amount of unconditional cash transfers is too small to pull the poor out 
of poverty cycle, yet if they positively affect their aspirations – desire to achieve something – it 
can have a long run impact. In this paper, I employ propensity score weighting and regression 
adjustment, to examine the impact of unconditional cash transfers (Benazir Income Support 
Program (BISP)) on aspirations of the adults in Pakistan. Using Pakistan Rural Household Panel 
Survey 2012-2013, I construct the aspirations index by weighting and aggregating on three 
dimensions; income, assets and social status. I find BISP cash transfers to increase aspirations if 
adults, yet it has differential impact based on gender and income quartile of the household.  
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Introduction 
In the developing world, cash transfer programs are seen as a key element within the 
national social protection strategy. Cash transfer programs have become increasingly popular in 
the last twenty years, demonstrating significant positive impact on education, health, nutrition, 
savings, investment, employment and empowerment indicators1. While some recent papers delve 
into the impact of cash transfers (mostly conditional) on the parents’ and children’s educational 
aspirations (Cirillo, 2019; Contreras Suarez & Cameron, 2016; García, Harker, & Cuartas, 2019; 
Gebremariam, Lodigiani, & Pasini, 2017), none of them specifically examine the impact of 
unconditional cash transfers on aspirations of the adults regarding their own income, asset 
ownership and social status within the society.  
Pakistan runs one of the largest unconditional cash transfer programs under the name of 
Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). Its annual disbursements rose from US$ 95.5 million 
in 2008-09 to US$ 576 million in 2015-16, disbursing a total amount of US$ 2.5 billion that it 
received from World Bank and other donor agencies (Government of Pakistan). The primary aim 
of BISP cash transfer is to provide assistance to chronically poor households to meet their basic 
needs with a supplementary goal of empowering women. Currently, the impact evaluations of 
BISP cash transfer focuses on household welfare and women’s empowerment indicators (Ambler 
& De Brauw, 2017; Iftikhar Cheema et al., 2014; I Cheema, Hunt, Javeed, Lone, & O’Leary, 
2016; Jalal, 2017). Moreover, Ghorpade and Justino (2019) examines the impact of BISP cash 
transfers – a foreign-funded aid – on political attitudes. Nonetheless, so far, there is no study 
 
1 See (Bastagli et al., 2016),(Molina Millan, Barham, Macours, Maluccio, & Stampini, 2016) and (Kabeer & 
Waddington, 2015) for detailed review of impact evaluations of the conditional and unconditional cash transfer 
programs.  
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examining the impact of BISP cash transfers on the aspirations of the individual belonging to 
beneficiary households. 
It is important to study the effect on aspirations – desire to achieve something – as it is 
associated with forward-looking behaviour of an individual. Higher aspirations (or lack thereof) 
determine the aims and goals, an individual wants to achieve. This implies that aspirations are a 
signficiant determinant of one’s efforts to change his/her conditions and work for a better future 
while making the right decision. Kosec & Mo (2017) run simple OLS regression to show a 
positive association between aspirations index and behaviors that reflect underlying efforts on 
part of the individual to improve future livelihood. Hence, it is imperative to study the effect of 
uncondtional cash transfer programs – targeting the poorest – on the aspirations of the 
beneficiaries to assess its long term impact.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of unconditional cash transfer (BISP) 
on aspirations of adults using Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (2012-2013)2, employing 
the inverse probability of treatment weights with regression adjustment methodology. A 
composite aspirations index is constructed by aggregating weighted average of aspirations on 
three dimensions; income, assets and social status. Further, the results are disaggregated by 
gender and household’s income quartile. The identification comes by comparing the individuals 
across households with varying treatment status, conditioned on the covariates and controlling 
for individual characteristics.  
In this paper, I hypothesize that the unconditional cash transfer program could lead to an 
improvement in aspirations for two reasons; First, it attenuates the economic constraint that 
could reduce their stress levels and give them mental and psychological space to make strategic 
 
2 Collected by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
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decisions. Second, it increases their trust in the government, assuring them of a safety net to fall 
back in case of an adverse economic shock. Aspirations failure or fatalism – lack of proactive 
and systematic effort to improves one’s own life – leads the less fortunate into behavioral 
poverty trap (Bernard, Taffesse, & Dercon, 2008; Dalton, Ghosal, & Mani, 2016). Higher 
aspirations make the beneficiaries forward-looking – willing to make an effort to change their 
conditions in the long run. In addition, the effect of BISP cash transfer is expected to vary based 
on gender and households’ income quartile. Since aspirations are shaped by life experiences, 
self-perception and is relative to your surrondings, women face extremely different opportunites 
(constraints) than men. Also, the worth of the cash transfer varies across each income quartile on 
the bases of their current position and relative to their surroundings. Therefore, a heterogenous 
effect is hypthesized based on gender and households’ income quartile.   
The findings indicate that BISP cash transfer has a positive and signficant impact on the 
men belonging to beneficiary households, increasing their aspirations by 0.133 units, that is, 0.24 
standard deviations. Amongst women, the impact is only significant for those belonging to the 
lowest income quartile increasing their aspirations by 0.117 units, that is, 0.25 standard 
deviations. While the impact is significant for full sample of men, for women it is restricted to 
the lowest quartile. This could reflect the weaker social restrictions in this economic class as 
otherwise women have a subordinate position in Pakistan where they experience mobility and 
labor force participation constraints (Kosec & Khan, 2016). However, the asset aspirations of 
working age women is signfiicantly boosted with cash transfer indicating that women see this 
lump-sum quarterly amount as a source of saving which they can use to buy inexpensive durable 
assets like bicycle. 
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These findings should inform the government and aid organizations of the potential long 
term benefits of the unconditional cash transfer programs. The chapter is organized as follows: 
The next section gives a brief context of the BISP cash transfer program followed by the 
literature review. Section 4 lays out the analytical framework illustrating the channels through 
which BISP cash transfer may effect aspirations, section 5 and 6 give the data & measure and 
empirical strategy, repectively. Section 7 discuss the findings of the paper and the final section 
concludes.  
Context 
While the cash transfers are rare in South Asia, Pakistan hosts a large unconditional cash 
transfer program under the name of Benazir Income Support Program (BISP). The annual 
disbursements rose from US$ 95.5 million in 2008-09 to US$ 576 million in 2015-16, disbursing 
a total amount of US $2.5 billion (Government of Pakistan). Based on the World bank report, 48 
percent of the BISP beneficiaries come from the poorest quintile (World Bank, 2015). It was 
developed and implemented as part of the Social Protection Strategy in 2008 in response to rapid 
food inflation, fuel prices at a 30-year high, and economic downturn (Government of Pakistan). 
In the short run, the main objective of BISP is to provide support to chronically poor households 
to meet their basic needs. In the long run, it aims to motivate households to invest in human 
capital (education, health and productive assets) that may assist them to graduate out of poverty 
(Ambler & De Brauw, 2017; Iftikhar Cheema et al., 2014; Government of Pakistan). In addition, 
BISP has a supplementary aim of empowering women. In order to achieve this, the cash transfers 
to the eligible households are made through ever-married women holding a valid National 
Identity Card. This policy had a twofold impact; first it made women the focal person within the 
 6 
household, and second, it encouraged them to register in the national database in order to avail 
the social safety benefits.  
The eligible households received a monthly unconditional cash transfer of PKR 1,000 
($15)3 in a quarterly tranche (Gazdar, 2011). The monthly transfer under BISP represented 6.3 
percent of the total household expenditure for the households receiving BISP payments and 5.9 
percent for the full sample (Ghorpade & Justino, 2019). Initially, eligibility is determined 
through political representatives who were responsible for choosing households within their 
respective constituencies (Khan & Qutub, 2010). Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
(PIDE), using the Pakistan Panel Household Survey (2010), found that 16.1 percent of the 
beneficiaries were ineligible for the program (Farooq, 2014).   
In 2009, the Government of Pakistan - in collaboration with the World Bank – employed 
a Proxy Means Test (PMT) to identify BISP recipients through a poverty scorecard estimated 
using 23-indicators4 (Hou, 2009). The poverty scorecard identified 16.17 as the eligibility cutoff 
which includes the bottom 25 percent of the population. All households with a score lower than 
and equal to 16.17 were eligible for BISP cash transfer and vice versa (Iftikhar Cheema et al., 
2014). However, a few exceptions were allowed for households lying between the scores of 
16.17 and 21.17; 1) at least one disabled member within the household, 2) at least one senior 
citizen (65+ years) in the household with fewer than three household members, 3) at least four or 
more children under the age of 12 (Ambler & De Brauw, 2017). From 2011 onwards, the 
eligibility of a household was determined through the PMT poverty scorecard. While all the 
beneficiaries under the previous system were claimed to have been re-vetted, Jalal (2017) found 
 
3 Using the US dollar to Pak Rs exchange rate of 2008; US $ 1 = PKR 67 
4 Refer to Appendix B, Table B1 for the list of Indicators.  
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an alarming rate of error in targeting on both sides of the spectrum - 53.1 percent of under 
coverage (or exclusion of those who should have been eligible) and 73.6 percent of over-
coverage (or inclusion ineligible households that end up as beneficiaries of BISP cash transfer).  
Literature Review 
In the developing world, cash transfers are being increasingly adopted as a key element 
within the national social protection strategy. While their short-term impact on educational and 
health outcomes is established through various studies, there is a dearth of literature examining 
the impact on the aspirations of the poor. A few studies that do look into the aspirations solely 
focus on the educational aspirations of parents and children. Gebremariam et. al. (2017) find a 
positive impact of Ethiopian Productive Safety-Net program, employing Young Lives 
longitudinal data (2002-2013), on children’s own educational aspirations (Gebremariam et al., 
2017).  
The conditional cash transfer (CCT), Familias en Accion, in Columbia, finds short run 
positive impact on parent’s educational aspirations of their children (García et al., 2019), while 
in the long run, there is no significant change in them (Contreras Suarez & Cameron, 2016). 
Whereas, in Peru, using Young Lives four waves (2002 -2013) data with inverse probability 
weighting methodology, a positive impact is estimated on parents’ educational aspirations of 
their children, both, in the short run and long run (Cirillo, 2019). However, none of these studies 
specifically examine the aspirations of adults regarding their income, asset ownership and status 
within the society.  
Kosec & Mo (2017) make an exception by studying a comprehensive index of aspirations 
of adults, constructed by weighting and aggregating with four dimensions; income, assets, social 
status and education. They use instrumental variables methodology to find that social protection 
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(Watan Card) mitigates the negative impact of natural disasters on individual aspirations index 
using IFPRI’s Pakistan Panel Rural Household Survey (2012-2013). Unconditional Cash 
Transfer (UST) programs provide assistance in terms of cash, giving the household an exogenous 
income boost. A study in Oaxaca, Mexico finds microfinance (exogenous cash) to have a 
positive impact on aspirations of participating adult women (Lybbert & Wydick, 2016), even 
though their measure of aspirations is not as comprehensive as of Kosec & Mo (2017).   
The BISP cash transfer evaluations primarily focus on women’s economic empowerment 
indicators and other welfare measures (health, education, consumption). The first impact 
evaluation finds a positive and significant local average treatment effect (LATE) on per adult 
monthly consumption expenditure using regression discontinuity design (RDD), within a 
bandwidth of 5 points (Iftikhar Cheema et al., 2014). In addition, they find a significant 
reduction in malnutrition of girls aged 0-5 years and a decrease in child labor within boys. They 
also find improved women empowerment indicators measured by – increased control over cash 
transfer, a sense of elevation by contributing to the household budget and reduced dependency 
on their husbands. However, the results showed no effect on the school enrollment of children 
nor on the household’s likelihood of owning assets. 
In the final impact evaluation, the authors, in addition to confirming the previous results, 
find (1) improvements in the living standards measured by an improved quality of flooring and 
the cooking fuel being used (2) increased investment in livestock ownership (I Cheema et al., 
2016). Jalal (2017), in her senior year thesis, focused on three areas; revisiting targeting 
efficiency, validation of PMT scorecard weights, and examining the BISP cash transfer impact 
on welfare measures using the difference-in-discontinuity methodology. She finds no impact of 
BISP cash transfer on household consumption, savings, debt or children’s welfare indicators. 
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Yet, there is an increased expenditure on inexpensive, durable items such as apparel and kitchen 
equipment. However, none of the impact evaluations examine the effect of BISP cash transfer on 
the aspirations of the beneficiaries. 
Ambler & De Brauw (2017) use the baseline and midline (2011-2013) impact evaluation 
data to assess the effect of BISP cash transfer on women’s empowerment indicators using RDD. 
They find improvement in various women’s economic empowerment indicators and in the 
measures capturing the perception of scocial norms such as women tolerating being beaten or 
men agreeing to help in the houshold work. Ghorpade and Justino (2019) examine the impact of 
BISP cash transfers – a foreign-funded aid – on political attitudes. They employ the IFPRI 
Pakistan Panel Rural Household Survey (2012-13), exploiting the stochastic eligibility cut-off for 
BISP cash transfer as an instrumental variable. Their findings indicate no substantive 
improvement in political attitudes of the participants in ‘nation-building’ districts – district 
lagging in development indicators, deemed as breeding grounds of alienation and conflict. 
Thereof, so far, there is no study examining the impact of BISP cash transfers on the aspirations 
of the beneficiary households. 
It is important to study the effect on aspirations – desire to achive something – as it is 
associated with forward-looking behaviour of an individual. Higher aspirations (or lack thereof) 
determine the aims and goals an individual wants to achieve. Low aspirations or ‘aspirations 
failure’ are equated with fatalism – a state when one does not dream of the future or aspire to 
one’s potential– leading to behavioral poverty trap (Bernard et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2016). 
Aspirations are correlated with individual’s, economic, political and social investment in one’s 
self and surroundings (Kosec & Khan, 2016; Mo, 2012). Kosec & Mo (2017) run simple OLS 
regression to show a positive association between aspirations index and behaviors that reflect 
 10 
underlying efforts on the part of the individual to improve future livelihood. Coleman & DeLeire 
(2003) find a greater sense of control over one’s life – believing that one’s action can affect 
outcomes – leading to higher high school graduation and school attendance rates. This implies 
that aspirations are a signficiant determinant of one’s efforts to change their conditions and work 
for a better future while making the right decision. Hence, it is imperative to study the effect of 
unconditional cash transfer programs – targeting the poorest – on the aspirations of the 
beneficiaries to assess its long term impact. 
Analytical Framework 
Aspirations are deemed as ideal futuristic hopes which are shaped by life experiences, 
social interaction, economic changes and personality – all of which will affect how one perceives 
their own life (Appadurai, 2004; Ray, 2006). However, in this paper, I will be focusing on the 
determinants related to the economic context of the individual and his surroundings. Income and 
wealth indicators are demonstrated to be positively related with aspirations. Literature indicates 
that the households located in slums are found to have lower educational aspirations for their 
children, compared to households located in non-slum areas in Kenya (Oketch, Mutisya, & 
Sagwe, 2012). Similarly, in China, the individuals who themselves or their peers have higher 
income are observed to have greater aspirations (Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012).  
Poverty lowers the aspirations of the poor, so they fail to reach their potential – this state 
is termed as ‘aspiration failure’(Bernard et al., 2008; Dalton et al., 2016). Kosec & Khan (2016) 
find that the aspirations of individuals belonging to lowest two income quintiles are 0.4 standard 
deviations lower than the individuals within the top three income quintiles in rural Pakistan. 
Credit constraints and lack of insurance become a source of stress due to higher uncertainty. 
Recent psychological evidence suggests that mental resources like motivation/attention are easily 
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depleted under stress (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Various 
experiment-based studies show that stressed individuals indulge in short-sighted and risk-averse 
decision making (Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, & Maréchal, 2015; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 
2013). It also leads to an increase in time discounting, that is, they prefer a smaller amount 
available immediately rather than a larger amount available in the future (Cornelisse, Van Ast, 
Haushofer, Seinstra, & Joels, 2013; Lerner, Li, & Weber, 2013). Bernard, Taffesse and Dercon 
(2011) find that fatalism – lack of proactive and systematic effort to improves one’s own life - 
reduces the demand of long-term loans and use of these loans for productive purpose in Ethiopia. 
Therefore, poverty may self-perpetuate, as aspiration’s failure hinder individuals from 
investing in small and feasible steps which have potentially substantial benefits in terms of 
improved life experiences (Bernheim, Ray, & Yeltekin, 2015; Ray, 2006). Social protection 
programs like unconditional cash transfers give poor people a reliable source of supplementary 
income for adverse situations. Cash transfers also directly affect the economic constraints of a 
household. These individuals who are already under stress due to tight economic conditions are 
provided with budgetary space. A randomized control study in Kenya shows that unconditional 
cash transfer improved psychological well-being and happiness of the participants (Haushofer & 
Shapiro, 2018). Several other studies find that unconditional cash transfers reduce signs of 
depression and stress (Baird, De Hoop, & Özler, 2013; Fernald, Hamad, Karlan, Ozer, & 
Zinman, 2008; Ssewamala, Neilands, Waldfogel, & Ismayilova, 2012). Kosec and Mo (2017) 
find that social safety net programs attenuate the negative impact of natural disaster (like floods) 
on adults’ aspirations in Pakistan.  
Aspirations are socially determined, through a group-based mechanism where the income 
and wealth of people around enters one’s aspirations function (Genicot & Ray, 2017; Suls & 
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Wheeler, 2013). The individual’s own income helps position one’s self within the social 
environment based on his perception of ‘similar’ and ‘attainable’ individuals (Genicot & Ray, 
2017; Ray, 2006). Social interactions with these comparable individuals or gaining information 
about them is demonstrated to have a positive influence on one’s aspirations. Experiments 
incorporating inspirational, leadership stories and interactions have proved to increase 
aspirations, especially for women (Beaman, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2012; Bernard, Dercon, 
Orkin, & Taffesse, 2019; Macours & Vakis, 2014; Tanguy, Dercon, Orkin, & Taffesse, 2014).  
These social safety programs are aimed to help the severely poor households and so in 
general, the amount given out in these programs is extremely small, regardless of the context. 
The minimalist amount offered by BISP cash transfer is valued far more by the severely poor, 
compared to the borderline poor or non-poor households.  The cash transfer, though a small 
amount, improves one’s position of these individuals within their group of severely poor 
households. However, the minute injection in income through cash transfer will not elevate the 
position of the individuals in the group of borderline poor or non-poor households.  For instance, 
an amount of $30, received as an exogenous income, adds much higher value for the households 
whose monthly consumption is $100, instead would have little worth for the households whose 
monthly consumption is $1000. Therefore, the effect of the cash transfer depends on the value of 
the amount given relative to one’s current income level.  Moreover, the severely poor people 
who are on the brink of starvation have elementary aspirations like, having two meals a day or 
wearing reasonable clothes out in public (Nathan, 2005). Hence, even a small cash transfer 
amount can improve their aspirations while it will not help borderline poor or non-poor 
households achieve anything tangible.  
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Apart from income and wealth, aspirations vary by gender and age. In rural Pakistan, on 
average the aspirations for women are found to be lower as compared to men (Kosec & Khan, 
2016). Kosec & Khan (2016) find that median aspired income of women is one-fifth of men, 
reflecting the lack of participation in paid labor market work. The authors suggest that women’s 
lower aspirations are driven by differences in perception of individual’s ability to achieve, due to 
unequal opportunities in education and paid work for them in the context of Pakistan. The 
psychological literature argues that the individual’s biased perceptions of their competence, built 
upon cultural beliefs, lead to gender differences in career choices (Correll, 2001; Ridgeway & 
Correll, 2004). Literature from India indicates that the patriarchal social structures constraints the 
aspirations of women compared to men, because even if they dare to aspire, they do not know if 
they will be permitted to achieve those aspirations (Shu & Marini, 1998). Therefore, women are 
observed to have flexible and fluid aspirations as they change, given the life circumstances. Their 
aspirations adapt to the patriarchal norms and limited opportunities as their life changes 
(Vijayakumar, 2013). For instance, marriage and husbands’ perceptions have a significant 
influence on women’s aspirations and therefore, an educated girl may not aspire as high as an 
equally qualified boy might, knowing her future depends on when and whom she will get 
married to. Women in Pakistan face similar constraints on mobility, labor force participation and 
lack the autonomy to make their own decisions that restricts their capacity to aspirations. 
However, the constrains vary by social and economic class women belong it. Women belonging 
to poorest households in Pakistan have least mobility constraint and higher female labor force 
participation, compared to women from affluent households. Thus, an exogenous income is 
expected to improve aspirations of severely poor women for two reasons; first, the relative value 
of the cash transfer with respect to the income level is highest for women belonging to poorest 
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income quartile, second, poor women face less stringent social constraints and they have higher 
labor force participation, a boost in exogenous income will make them forward looking.  
Moreover, aspirations are thought to be nurtured young and that is why a large amount of 
literature focuses on the educational and career aspirations of high school and university 
graduates (Al-Bahrani, Allawati, Abu Shindi, & Bakkar, 2020; Hafsyan, 2015; Khattab, 2015). 
This is the case because, then these individuals have a whole life in front of them and they can 
aspire and invest accordingly to shape their future. However, as people get old, it becomes 
difficult to change their perceptions based on their life-long experiences and they lack the will to 
drastically change their trajectory. Therefore, it is expected that the cash transfers will have a 
greater effect on younger individuals.  
In this paper, I hypothesize that the unconditional cash transfer program could lead to an 
improvement in aspirations for two reasons. First, it attenuates the economic constraint that 
could reduce their stress levels and give them mental and psychological space to make strategic 
decisions. Second, it increases their trust in the government, assuring them of a safety net to fall 
back in case of an adverse economic shock. I expect the impact of BISP cash transfer on the 
aspirations to vary by gender and income quartile of the household.  
Data and Measures 
Data 
I am using Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (PRHPS) 2012-2014 collected by 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (International Food Policy Research 
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Institute & Innovative Development Strategies, 2014, 2016)5. In this paper primarily, the first 
two rounds are utilized; March – April 2012 (Round 1) and April – May 2013 (Round 2).  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Individual and Household Level Characteristics by Household's 
Beneficiary Status. 
 Full Sample 
 
Beneficiary 
Households 
Non-
Beneficiary 
Households 
 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Diff T-Stats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Individual Level Characteristics 
Average Age (in years) 38.88 13.74 38.18 15.29 37.78 15.84 2.03*** (6.63) 
Female 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 -0.02* (-2.46) 
Currently Married 0.85 0.36 0.69 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.07*** (9.17) 
Never Married 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 -0.07*** (-9.26) 
Widow/Divorced 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.00 (0.75) 
Literate 0.27 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.38 0.49 0.13*** (18.47) 
Observations 6,677 6,677 959 959 5,697 5,697   
Pabel B: Household Level Characteristics 
Female Headed Households 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.01 (0.71) 
Household Heads ever attended 
school 
0.51 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.10*** (12.38) 
Proportion of Household with 
Children (5-16 Years) Attending 
School 
0.38 0.43 0.28 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.16*** (25.35) 
Household Composition:         
Average Household Size  6.49 3.00 7.27 2.84 6.35 3.00 -0.59*** (-10.66) 
Number of Children (0-7 Years) 2.65 2.67 2.95 2.63 2.59 2.67 -0.11* (-2.23) 
Number of Employed Household 
Members 
2.62 1.71 2.67 1.71 2.62 1.71 -0.05 (-1.35) 
Number of Elderly (65+ Years) 0.19 0.47 0.21 0.50 0.19 0.46 0.04*** (5.36) 
Household with Disabled Members 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.00 (1.12) 
Income/Wealth Indicators         
Per Adult Equivalent Monthly 
Consumption Expenditure on Non-
Durable (PKR) 
1725.3 840.5 1448.
4 
722.2 1775.6 850.6 261.8*** (24.37) 
Number of rooms per household 
member 
0.41 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.43 0.27 0.11*** (26.39) 
No toilet in the household 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.33 0.47 -0.11*** (-13.13) 
Dry pit latrine 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.20 0.40 -0.03*** (-4.33) 
Flush, connected to public sewerage 
or pit 
0.45 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.14*** (17.29) 
Average Agricultural Land Owned 
(Acres) 
1.83 5.41 1.17 3.23 1.95 5.71 1.04*** (12.84) 
Households that own 
Fridge/Freezer/Cooler 
0.30 0.46 0.14 0.35 0.33 0.47 0.20*** (32.24) 
Households that own AC/Air 
Cooler/Geyser/Heater 
0.04 0.20 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.02*** (11.86) 
 
5 This dataset has been used in several academic papers including (Kosec & Mo, 2017), (Ghorpade & Justino, 2019) 
and (Saleemi & Kofol, 2020). 
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Households that have that own 
Stove/Cooking Range/Oven 
0.61 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.05*** (5.65) 
Households that own Television 0.43 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.13*** (16.89) 
Households that own Car 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 -0.00 (-0.06) 
Households that own Motorbike 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.08*** (8.70) 
Households that owns Livestock 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.01 (1.58) 
Observations 2,090 2,090 303 303 1,787 1,787   
Note: Household survey weights are used; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
PRHPS is an extensive survey covering various topics. It encompasses data from 76 rural 
villages from all four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Baluchistan) of Pakistan and a total of 
2,090 households (Nazli & Haider, 2012). The information on access to social protection 
programs is available in both rounds. The data collection on aspirations targets the household 
head, spouse and the youngest member in the household between the age of 18 and 35 (if any). 
The sample includes data on 2,325 men and 2,411 women, aged 18 and above, who responded to 
the aspiration’s questionnaire in the first wave. Of these 2,411 women, a panel data is available 
for 1,819 women, in addition to cross-sectional data of 592 women in round 1 (year 2012) and 
124 women in round 2 (year 2013).  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the individual and household-level 
characteristics. Panel A reports the individual-level characteristics. Of the full sample, the 
respondents on average are 39 years old, 65 percent are females, 11 percent are never married, 
85 percent are currently married, and 27 percent are literate. Panel B reports the household 
characteristics. The household heads on average are 99.8 percent males and 51 percent have 
attended school. A typical household comprises 6 household members including 2 children aged 
0 – 7 years and two employed household members. Their per adult equivalent monthly 
consumption expenditure6 is PKR 1,725 ($18)7 and on average own 1.83 acres of land. Of the 
 
6 The Ault Equivalence used for BISP is followed here. It used the following formula = 0.8* (Under 18) + 1*(Over 
18) (Cheema et al., 2014). 
7 Converted according to 2012 Exchange rate when $1=PKR 95. 
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total sample, 35 percent of the households do not have access to any toilet, 30 percent own a 
refrigerator, cooler or freezer, 61 percent own a cooking stove or oven, 43 percent own a 
television, 57 percent own some kind of livestock8, and 24 percent own a motorbike.  
Table 1 gives the average individual and household level characteristics of beneficiary 
households in columns 3 and 4, and of non-beneficiary households in columns 5 and 6. The 
difference in means of the two groups and their t-statistics is given in columns 7 and 8. While 
comparing the characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, their averages are 
significantly different as indicated by the t-statistics in table 1. 
Measures 
The primary outcome variable is the individual’s aspiration level. Aspiration data 
encompasses three aspects; income, assets and social status. Since an individual’s aspirations are 
affected by the social environment and other individuals in it (Suls & Wheeler, 2013), the index 
is normalized at the district level. I construct an index, following (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard 
& Taffesse, 2012; Kosec & Mo, 2017) that sums up the weighted averages of normalized 
aspiration level. The respondents were explicitly asked to report the aspired level of personal 
income, value of assets and the level of social status (on a 10 – step ladder of possibilities)9. 
First, the aspiration level on each dimension is normalized by subtracting the district-level 
average and then dividing it by the standard deviation for individuals within the same district. 
Therefore, the respondents with aspiration levels above (below) the district average have a 
positive (negative) value for the normalized outcome. Each individual was asked to allocate 20 
 
8 It may include sheep, goat, cow, buffalo etc. 
9 The detailed questions on aspirations are given in Appendix B. 
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beans across each dimension, based on their relative importance. The index is weighted by the 
share of beans10 placed by the individual and is formalized as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  ∑ (𝑎𝑛𝑖 − 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝜎𝑛𝑑 )3𝑛=1 𝑤𝑛𝑖  
where 𝑎𝑛𝑖  is the aspiration level of dimension 𝑛 by individual 𝑖 living in district 𝑑, 𝑢𝑛𝑑 is 
the district level average of aspiration and 𝜎𝑛𝑑 is the standard deviation of the aspirations for 
dimension 𝑛 in district 𝑑. The weight assigned by each individual 𝑖 to the dimension 𝑛 of the 
aspirations is given by 𝑤𝑛𝑖 .11 Table 2 (column 1), Panel A, provides the summary statistics for 
composite aspirations index and normalized aspiration level for each dimension. An average 
individual has an aspiration level of 0.003 with a standard deviation of 0.494. Since the measure 
of aspirations is normalized at the district level, the positive aspirations indicate that the 
individual’s aspirations level are above the district average. It is interesting to note that 
disaggregating the aspiration by gender exhibits, on average, negative aspirations for women 
compared to positive aspirations for men, in each of the dimensions. The negative aspirations of 
women in all three dimensions reflects the status of women in Pakistan’s society – subordinate to 
men in the household as per the social norms leading to lack of asset ownership and trivial labor 
force participation rates, especially paid work and hence lower aspirations. Furthermore, the 
average disaggregated by income quartile, proxied by per adult monthly consumption 
expenditure, indicates lower aspirations (negative) in lower quartiles and higher aspirations 
(positive) in the top two quartiles. Panel B gives the actual aspiration levels, indicating that an 
average person aspires for a monthly income of PKR 192,673 ($1,147), average assets of PKR 
 
10 The share of beans is calculated by dividing the number of beans assigned to the given dimension by 20.  
11 Note that the index is a weighted average of three normally distributed variables with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1 (the normalized aspiration level of each dimension). However, the composite index itself is not 
distributed normally with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
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350,770 ($2,088), and social status of 7.12 on a ladder of 1 to 10 - 10 being the highest. Columns 
(2) and (3) provide the means by treatment – beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Hence, 
the poorer individual and women have lower aspirations as indicated by negative aspirations 
index and is true for all three dimensions.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Normalized Aspirations, by Gender and Consumption Quartile 
 Mean SD N 
Panel A: Normalized Aspiration Level    
Full Sample    
Composite Aspirations Index 0.003 0.494 6677 
Normalized Aspirations: Income -0.003 0.355 4984 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets -0.001 0.226 6512 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status 0.006 0.233 6671 
Males    
Composite Aspirations Index 0.118 0.560 2323.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income 0.082 0.394 2254.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets 0.006 0.215 2289.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status 0.032 0.215 2320.00 
Females    
Composite Aspirations Index -0.058 0.442 4354.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income -0.074 0.301 2730.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets -0.004 0.232 4223.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status -0.007 0.241 4351.00 
By Income Quartile    
1st Quartile (Lowest)    
Composite Aspirations Index -0.051 0.473 1327.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income -0.032 0.348 1033.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets -0.012 0.200 1301.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status -0.014 0.227 1325.00 
2nd Quartile     
Composite Aspirations Index -0.036 0.426 1517.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income -0.018 0.288 1129.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets -0.014 0.179 1495.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status -0.009 0.226 1515.00 
3rd Quartile    
Composite Aspirations Index 0.014 0.520 1684.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income -0.002 0.389 1244.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets 0.005 0.244 1647.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status 0.011 0.228 1684.00 
4th Quartile    
Composite Aspirations Index 0.055 0.524 2128.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Income 0.024 0.372 1566.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Assets 0.012 0.254 2048.00 
Normalized Aspirations: Social Status 0.026 0.244 2126.00 
Panel B: Actual Aspiration Level1    
Average Aspirations: Monthly Income (PKR) 192,673 869,124 3854 
Average Aspirations: Assets (PKR) 350,770 2,173,889 6683 
Average Aspirations: Social Status 7.717 1.935 6743 
Note:    Non-weighted averages are given in the table.  
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1: Exact Survey questions to capture aspirations:  (a) What is the level of personal income you would like to 
achieve? (b) What is the level of assets that you would like to achieve? (c) On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest 
and 10 being the highest level of social status one has, answer the following section: What is the level of social 
status that you would like to achieve? 
Empirical Strategy 
Identification 
There is a potential endogeneity issue when assessing the impact of unconditional cash 
transfer on aspirations of the beneficiary households. The eligible households for unconditional 
cash transfer are chronically poor households who may already suffer from lower aspirations 
compared to the non-eligible households. The data described above illustrate that the aspirations 
are negative for individuals in the first income quartile, implying their aspirations are lower than 
the district level average, while the aspirations are positive for individuals in the fourth quartile, 
implying the aspirations are higher than the district level average. 
 In the absence of a randomized selection process of the BISP beneficiary households and 
data collection after the program had started, there is a need to find an appropriate counterfactual 
in order to identify the causal effect. A propensity score is created to match a household based on 
covariates (𝑋), which predicts the probability of the household to receive treatment. Note that 
this paper is mainly measuring the household level impact of BISP cash transfers – the level at 
which the treatment covariates are matched – on the aspirations of the household members. The 
identification comes through the comparison of individuals across households, that vary by the 
treatment status, while conditioned on the covariates and controlled for individual characteristics. 
For each household ℎ in the sample, let 𝑇ℎ indicate the treatment status, where 𝑇ℎ = 1 if the 
household received the unconditional cash transfer (BISP) [treated household] and 𝑇ℎ = 0 if the 
household did not receive unconditional cash transfer (BISP) [control household]. The 
propensity score is formally defined as: 
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𝑒(𝑥) = Pr(𝑇 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥),    (1) 
assuming, 0 < 𝑒(𝑥) < 1,  ∀  𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 
To select the covariates for propensity score matching, it is suggested to choose variables 
that affect the treatment selection process (Austin & Stuart, 2015). Since BISP eligibility is 
determined through PMT poverty scorecard – targeting the chronically poor households – I 
include the following conditional covariates to predict the treatment status: reconstructed poverty 
scorecard, wealth [house owned, drinking water source, walls construction material 
(mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of adult 
men and women in the household (18-65 years) and the social status indicators (household’s 
years of schooling and employment status)]. The data has two types of non-compliers; first, 
household that are eligible based on their poverty scorecard, yet are do not receive the cash 
transfer and second, those who are not eligible but receive the cash transfers. In the case of 
former, I posit that the lack of computerized national identity card (CNIC) may result in eligible 
households not receiving the BISP cash transfer since it is one of the requirements, while, the 
latter households may be the ones who use their social and political influence to receive cash 
transfers. Therefore, to capture the characteristics of non-compliers, I control if the married 
woman in the household has a national identity card and if the household has religious, political 
or administrative connections.  
The most significant covariate, PMT scorecard, is not directly observed in this data set. 
As a next best alternative, I reconstruct the poverty scorecard based on the survey data collected 
in 2012 (first round of PRHPS) using the same formula as used in the 2008-09 Poverty Census of 
 22 
the BISP (Hou, 2009; Vashwanath, Hou, & Yoshida, 2009)12. Despite the fact that the weights 
used to construct the PMT scorecard are based on 2007-08 data, they are assumed to be valid for 
2012 dataset since the poverty scorecard indicators are correlates of chronic poverty (Ghorpade 
& Justino, 2019).  
I am using Inverse Propensity Weighting (IPW) to match the treatment and control 
groups. The inverse probability of treatment weighting assigns each unit a weight equivalent to 
the inverse probability of receiving the treatment. The advantage of IPW in comparison to the 
other techniques of matching is that the whole sample is utilized. Weighting is done to remove 
the correlation between the treatment status and the covariates (X). As per the potential outcome 
notation, 𝑌𝑖(0) denotes the outcome of individual 𝑖 belonging to a control household and 𝑌𝑖(1) is 
outcome of an individual 𝑖 belonging to a treated household. While the treatment effect may be 
given by: 𝑌𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑖(0) 
I am interested in the average treatment effect on the treated, 𝜏𝑖ℎ = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖ℎ(1) − 𝑌𝑖ℎ(0)|𝑇ℎ = 1]              (2) 
that evaluates the effect of the treatment on the subpopulation that is likely to take up the 
treatment. In reality, we only observe either of the events, 𝑌𝑖(0) or 𝑌𝑖(1), that is if a household 
may be treated or controlled, it cannot be both simultaneously. Since I am interested in the 
average treatment effect on the treated, the treated households are assigned a weight of unity and 
control household 𝑒(𝑥)1− 𝑒(𝑥):  
 
12 Appendix B, Table B1 lays out in detail the 23 indicators used to predict weights for PMT scorecard. (Ghorpade 
& Justino, 2019) also reconstructed PMT scorecard using the same dataset. The indicators are assigned the scores 
pre-determined by Hou (2009). These scores are aggregated to calculate the PMT Score card.  
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𝜔 (𝑡, 𝑥) =  𝑡 + (1 − 𝑡). 𝑒 ̂(𝑥)1−𝑒 ̂(𝑥)   (3) 
Before a causal effect can be drawn by comparing the treatment and control household in 
the matched sample, three critical assumptions need to be met; 1) Conditional Independence, 2) 
Common Support, 3) Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). Now I will examine if 
all three assumptions hold for the sample matched using Inverse Probability Weighting. 
Unconfoundedness or conditional independence implies that, conditional on the covariates, the 
treatment indicator is independent of the potential outcome: 
T ⊥ 𝑌(0), 𝑌(1)|𝑋 
It suggests that the best match of the units will be one that only differs in the treatment assigned, 
which otherwise, are identical in terms of covariates (Hirano & Imbens, 2001; Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1978). This assumption validates the comparison of treatment and control 
groups with the same value of covariates. It may be violated if the covariate vector (𝑋ℎ) includes 
variables that may themselves be affected by the treatment. 
Table 3: Assessing Conditional Independence Assumption: Average Treatment Effect of Non-
Beneficiary Eligible Households Vs Non-Beneficiary Ineligible Households. 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Full Sample     
BISP Beneficiary 0.032 0.071 0.036 -0.017 
 (0.078) (0.047) (0.034) (0.026) 
Observations 4,620 3,361 4,515 4,630 
Panel B: Women     
BISP Beneficiary -0.039 0.007 0.004 0.021 
 (0.046) (0.028) (0.019) (0.030) 
Observations 3,008 1,794 2,924 3,020 
Panel C: Men     
BISP Beneficiary -0.021 0.013 0.026 -0.068 
 (0.084) (0.044) (0.021) (0.045) 
Observations 1,612 1,567 1,591 1,610 
Note: Robust standard errors ; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, age squared, marital status, Highest level of education 
attained, binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
It is impossible to test this assumption directly, therefore, to check conditional 
independence, I test for the ‘pseudo’ treatment effect between two control groups as suggested 
by Imbens & Wooldridge (2009). I take the non-beneficiary, eligible13 households as the 
treatment group, and the non-beneficiary, ineligible households as the control group. Table 3 
provides the ‘pseudo’ average treatment effect on the treated that is statistically insignificant for 
the full sample and by gender for all individuals above 18 years old. It strengthens our faith in 
the conditional independence assumption which forms the basis of my results.  
Table 4: Covariate Balance in Raw and Weighted Data Samples. 
 Standardized Differences Variance Ratio 
 Raw Weighted Raw Weighted 
PMT Score  -0.786 -0.019 0.769 1.072 
Household Head’s Years of Schooling -0.243 -0.015 0.782 1.009 
Household Head is Employed 0.048 0.002 0.867 0.990 
Wealth Indicators     
House Owned 0.026 -0.021 0.949 1.047 
Property Owned 0.014 0.006 .971 1.016 
Mud Walls 0.368 -0.014 1.027 1.004 
Brick Walls -0.465 0.006 0.821 1.005 
Drinking Water Source     
Hand Pump 0.011 -0.032 0.979 1.070 
Piped Water 0.056 0.050 1.198 1.172 
Remittances Received -0.002 0.011 0.986 1.075 
Household Composition     
Household Size 0.386 -0.000 0.926 0.881 
Number of Children (0-7 years) 0.122 -0.003 0.929 0.926 
Number of Employed Members 0 .082 0.003 1.105 1.042 
Number of Observations 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,866 
Beneficiary Households [Treated] 282 936.9 282 936.9 
Non-Beneficiary Households [Control] 1,584 929.1 1,584 929.1 
Over-Identification Test (Prob >Chi2) 0.8596 
 
The second assumption is of common support or ‘overlap’. This regards to the existence 
of both control and treatment households over a common covariate distribution. The first two 
 
13 The eligible households are the ones who has their poverty scorecard less than 21 and ineligible households are 
the ones with poverty scorecard greater than 21. Due to the exception cases between the range of 16.17 to 21.17, I 
take the eligibility cut-off to 21.  
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assumptions together are known as the assumption of strong ignorability (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983). The covariate balance for the treatment regression is tested in table 4 that provides the 
mean standardized differences and variance ratio for the raw and weighted data samples14. The 
standardized differences should ideally be 0 and variance ratio should be 1. It is noted that the 
standardized differences for all covariates are much closer to zero in the weighted sample 
compared to the raw sample. The greatest absolute standardized difference in means of treatment 
and control households is 0.05 for a piped water source for drinking. Similarly, the variance ratio 
is closer to 1 for weighted data compared to raw data, and piped water remains the one which is 
off target by 0.17. The overidentification test has a null hypothesis that the covariates are 
balances for treatment and control groups (Imai & Ratkovic, 2014). A formal chi-square test is 
developed by Imai & Ratkovic (2014) to check the covariate balance. The p-value for this test is 
estimated to be 0.8569, failing to reject the null hypothesis and hence confirming that the 
treatment covariates are balanced in weighted beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. 
Therefore, I can confidently claim that the assumption of common support holds true in the 
weighted sample. Besides, figure 2, exhibits the kernel density curves for the primary covariate, 
PMT scorecard, whose overlap between treatment and control group improves significantly in 
weighted data.   
 
14 See (Austin, 2009)for details on covariate balance diagnostics.  
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Figure 1: Kernel Density of PMT Score Card for the Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary Households. 
The third assumption is called the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), 
stating that the outcome on one unit is not affected by the treatment of other units. That is, the 
beneficiary household receiving the cash transfer will not affect the aspirations of individual 𝑖 
belonging to household ℎ.  
Furthermore, the BISP targeting has demonstrated poor performance including many 
errors of exclusion and inclusion (Jalal, 2017). Jalal (2017) finds that there is 53.1% of under-
coverage (exclusion), that is eligible households which do not receive BISP cash transfer and 
73.6% rate of over-coverage (inclusion), that is ineligible households who benefit from BISP 
cash transfer. This gives me an opportunity to examines the heterogenous effect of BISP cash 
transfer across the income quartiles not limiting the analysis to local treatment effect, comparing 
the eligible and non-eligible households around the cut-off point. However, this may also result 
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in spillover effects, that is, if treatment status differs between two eligible households in the 
same community, the cash transfer may negatively affect the aspirations of the non-beneficiary 
households within the same village. To isolate the pure treatment effect, I also examine the effect 
across villages, that is, comparing the outcomes of treated households in treated villages and 
control households in control villages, where no other household got cash transfer.  
Empirical Methodology 
To examine the impact of unconditional cash transfer (BISP) on aspirations of adults, I 
employ the inverse probability of treatment weights with regression adjustment, first developed 
by Robins & Rotnizky (1995). Combining the propensity score and regression methods help 
achieve some robustness to misspecification. While weighting removes the correlation between 𝑇ℎ and 𝑋𝑖ℎ, the regression adjustment removes the direct effect of 𝑋𝑖ℎ (Imbens & Wooldridge, 
2009). In this estimator, the weights are normalized, so they add up to one in each treatment 
group (Hirano & Imbens, 2001). In the first step, the sample is matched to create counterfactual 
using Inverse Probability Weighting, as discussed in the previous section. Regression 
adjustment, in the second step, estimates two conditional means by linear function using 
weighted least squares method applied separately to the treatment and control group. The 
difference between the two conditional-means of different group gives us the treatment effect. 
The average treatment effect of the treated can formally be written as: using the full sample:  𝑌𝑖ℎ =  𝛾 +  𝜏. 𝑇ℎ +  𝛿𝑋𝑖ℎ +  𝜃(𝑋𝑖ℎ −  ?̅?)𝑇ℎ + 𝜀𝑖ℎ   (4) 
where 𝑌𝑖ℎ (outcome variable) is the aspiration measures (composite index and individual 
dimensions) of individual 𝑖 belonging to household ℎ,  ?̅? is the sample average of 𝑋𝑖ℎ for the 
sub-sample of treated households using the weights given in equation (2); 𝑋𝑖ℎ is the covariate 
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vector that includes variables for both treatment and outcome equation. The term (𝑋𝑖ℎ −  ?̅?)𝑇ℎ 
captures the non-parallel effect of the treatment on the treated and control groups. 
This method is called ‘double-robust’ estimator as it requires a propensity score and the 
outcome model in the same estimator. The results would be unbiased if any one of them is 
correctly specified (Emsley, Lunt, Pickles, & Dunn, 2008; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; 
Rotnitzky & Robins, 1995). Moreover, it is a beneficial model when estimating individual 
outcomes instead of household-level as it allows to control for individual-level covariates in the 
regression besides household-level covariates employed for propensity score weighting (Veras 
Soares, Perez Ribas, & Issamu Hirata, 2010).   
The two estimation techniques – IPW and regression adjustment – allows for different set 
of covariates in the treatment equation and the outcome equation (Hirano & Imbens, 2001). 
Treatment covariates include reconstructed poverty scorecard, wealth [house owned, property 
owned, drinking water source, walls construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], 
household composition [household size, number of children (0-7 years), number of employed 
individuals in the household] and social status indicators (the household head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). The regression covariates in the outcome equation include the 
age and age squared to capture the life cycle stage, gender, marital status, highest level of 
education achieved, employment status, household’s per adult equivalent consumption 
expenditure besides PMT Scorecard and social status indicators that are already included in the 
treatment regression. While the treatment balances the covariates at the household level, the 
outcome variables control for individual-level aspirations. Thereof, it captures the effect of 
unconditional cash transfer on aspirations after considering an individual’s demographics, 
economic, and social status (Kosec & Mo, 2017).  
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Results 
Table 5 provides the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of BISP cash 
transfers on the aspirations of adults aged 18+ years by gender. Here, the outcome is compared 
between beneficiary households and non-beneficiary households regardless of their eligibility. 
Panel A shows the results of the full sample, indicating BISP cash transfer has a positive impact 
on normalized composite aspirations index (column 1) of 0.06 units. This implies that the BISP 
cash transfer boosts the aspirations by 0.12 standard deviations15. To put this in perspective, as a 
percentage of the average potential outcome of non-beneficiary households, there is an increase 
of 115 percent in adult aspirations belonging to beneficiary households. Decomposing the index 
of aspirations, the most significant impact is on income aspirations (0.039) followed by social 
status (0.017) and assets (0.012).   
Table 5: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of 
adults (18+ years), by gender 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Full Sample     
BISP Beneficiary 0.060*** 0.039** 0.012* 0.017* 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.152 1.612 0.611 1.280 
Observations 6,610 4,950 6,498 6,660 
Panel B: Women     
BISP Beneficiary 0.019 0.007 0.008 0.011 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.164 0.073 0.326 0.391 
Observations 4,296 2,704 4,218 4,348 
Panel C: Men     
BISP Beneficiary 0.133*** 0.084*** 0.019* 0.031** 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.011) (0.014) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.707 1.165 2.318 2.277 
Observations 2,314 2,246 2,280 2,312 
 
15  This is calculated by dividing the coefficient of BISP Beneficiary (0.06) with the standard deviation of aspirations 
composite index (0.494) given in table 2. The effect on aspirations is comparable with literature using same data. 
Kosec & Mo (2017) find that natural disasters like floods reduce the aspirations of the individuals in the affected 
households by 0.15 standard deviations. 
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Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
However, when the sample is disaggregated by gender, as shown in Table 5 Panel B, 
there is statistically insignificant impact on women, on the composite index of aspirations 
and each of the individual dimensions. In contrast, the impact on men is statistically significant 
and far more magnified. The aspiration of the men in beneficiary households increases by 0.133 
units, that is, 0.24 standard deviation16 increase in aspirations index and 170 percent higher than 
the potential aspirations of men belonging to non-beneficiary households. It is noteworthy that 
the actual recipients of the cash transfer (ever-married women) are the ones who don’t 
experience an impact on their aspirations, while men do. Based on literature, various reasons can 
be identified to explain the difference in the impact of increased exogenous income on 
aspirations of men and women. In Pakistan, men are relegated with the financial responsibility of 
the households while women are responsible only for unpaid reproductive work (Quisumbing & 
Maluccio, 2000). The exogenous income helps the men to meet their financial targets, improving 
their status in the society and income aspirations while women remain unaffected. In addition, 
the patriarchal social structures shape the aspirations differently for women compared to men. 
While it leads women to have biased self-perceptions (Kosec & Khan, 2016) it also constraints 
their aspirations because if they dare to aspire, they do not know if they will be permitted to 
achieve those aspirations (Shu & Marini, 1998).  
 
16 This is calculated by dividing the coefficient of BISP Beneficiary (0.133) with the standard deviation of 
aspirations composite index for men (0.560) given in table 2. 
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Further, the results are disaggregated by income quartile proxied by per adult monthly 
consumption expenditure. Tables 6,7 and 8 give average treatment effect on the treated by 
income quartiles for the full sample, women and men, respectively. Note that BISP cash transfers  
 increase the aspirations of individuals belonging to the poorest households. The 
composite aspirations index is 0.117 units higher, that is 0.19 standard deviations17, for the 
beneficiary households compared to the average aspirations index in non-beneficiary households. 
BISP cash  transfer increases the aspirations for income, assets, and social status of individuals in 
treated households. Nonetheless, the cash transfers have statistically insignificant impact on the  
Table 6: Average Treatment Impact of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of adults (18+ years), 
By Income Quartile 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: First Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.117*** 0.065** 0.032*** 0.036** 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.011) (0.015) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.278 1.245 1.037 1.567 
Observations 1,709 1,332 1,679 1,711 
Panel B: Second Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.071 0.051 0.019 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.012) (0.018) 
Observations 1,687 1,250 1,670 1,697 
Panel C: Third Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.040 0.039 -0.016 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.016) (0.018) 
Observations 1,633 1,201 1,617 1,652 
Panel D: Fourth Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary -0.053 -0.027 -0.004 -0.028 
 (0.039) (0.027) (0.012) (0.023) 
Observations 1,581 1,167 1,532 1,600 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
 
17 This is calculated by dividing the coefficient of BISP Beneficiary (0.117) with the standard deviation of 
aspirations composite index for first quartile (0.607) given in table 2. Similar calculations are made in the rest of the 
paper. 
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consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
aspirations of the individuals belonging to remaining three income quartiles. 
Disaggregating the results by gender, Table 7 provides the results for women for each of 
the income quartile. The BISP cash transfers have positive impact on the composite aspirations 
index for women belonging to the poorest household quartile (results reported in Table 7, Panel  
Table 7: Average Treatment Impact of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of Women (18+ 
years), By Income Quartile 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: First Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.080** 0.059 0.025* 0.028 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.014) (0.019) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.525 0.459 0.774 0.740 
Observations 1,124 767 1,101 1,127 
Panel B: Second Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.011 -0.017 0.020 0.010 
 (0.037) (0.025) (0.016) (0.023) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.107 -0.228 0.709 0.299 
Observations 1,107 685 1,094 1,117 
Panel C: Third Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.020 0.008 -0.011 0.030 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.191 0.073 -0.483 1.551 
Observations 1,056 641 1,045 1,074 
Panel D: Fourth Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary -0.106*** -0.080** -0.013 -0.048* 
 (0.040) (0.024) (0.014) (0.029) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome -1.254 -1.584 -0.610 -2.168 
Observations 1,009 611 978 1,030 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
 33 
A). It raises the aspirations by 0.08 units, that is, 0.18 standard deviations and 52.5 
percent higher than the average of non-beneficiary households. It is interesting to note that 
treated women, belonging to the lowest income-quartile, indicate improved asset aspirations of 
0.025 units, that is, 0.05 standard deviations yet they do not have a significant impact on income 
or social status aspirations. This is 77.4 percent higher than the average asset aspirations in the 
control group. The quarterly BISP cash transfers are deemed as an opportunity to buy 
inexpensive assets like bicycles etc. since the poor do not have the luxury to save otherwise. This 
finding is supported by Cheema et. al. (2016) who finds increased ownership of inexpensive 
durable goods in the final impact evaluation of BISP cash transfer program. The exogenous 
income is expected to improve aspirations of severely poor women for two reasons: first, the 
relative value of the cash transfer with respect to the income level is highest for women 
belonging to poorest income quartile; second, poor women face less stringent social constraints 
and they have higher labor force participation. Therefore, in Pakistan the BISP cash transfer 
improves the aspirations of the severely poor women and does not affect the others.  
 It is noteworthy that women in highest income quartile or affluent background, 
receiving the BISP cash transfer experience a negative impact on their aspirations of 0.106 units, 
that is, 0.17 standard deviations and 125 percent lower than the non-beneficiary households in 
the same income quartile. Due to the inclusion error, there are women receiving BISP cash 
transfer while belonging to the wealthy households. The descriptive statistics indicate that the 
aspirations are higher for individuals belonging to the fourth income quartile whereas they are 
negative for the individuals belonging to the bottom two quartiles. This result indicates that since 
the aspirations of the individuals, in general, are higher in fourth quartile, a miniscule amount of 
money (relative to their own household income and individuals in the same group) does not have 
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any worth. Instead, since BISP cash has to be collected by the woman herself, she might be 
socially embarrassed as she publicly accepts benefiting from a program that is meant for severely 
poor households.  
Table 8: Average Treatment Impact of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of Men (18+ years), 
By Income Quartile 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: First Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.196*** 0.099** 0.046** 0.055** 
 (0.058) (0.040) (0.019) (0.024) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 9.319 2.210 1.624 17.16 
Observations 585 565 578 584 
Panel B: Second Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.188* 0.163* 0.023 0.006 
 (0.102) (0.094) (0.019) (0.029) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 3.422 2.846 1.195 0.360 
Observations 580 565 576 580 
Panel C: Third Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.076 0.078 -0.024 0.024 
 (0.092) (0.067) (0.032) (0.027) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.648 1.212 -0.935 0.886 
Observations 577 560 572 578 
Panel D: Fourth Quartile     
BISP Beneficiary 0.047 0.021 0.015 0.008 
 (0.080) (0.049) (0.023) (0.039) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.401 0.240 13.11 0.286 
Observations   572 556 554 570 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
Table 8 reports the ATET of BISP cash transfer for men by income quartile. Similar to 
women, the cash transfer also has the greatest impact on men belonging to the lowest income 
quartiles (poorer households). BISP cash transfers have a positive and statistically significant 
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impact on the aspirations of men in first- and second-income quartile. Men in the first income 
quartile experience 0.196 units increase in aspirations index, that is, 0.41 standard deviations 
higher than the non-beneficiary households in the same income quartile. It also has a positive 
impact on income, assets, and social status aspirations. Men have a similar positive impact in 
second income quartile, with a boost in aspiration index of 0.188 points, that is, 0.44 standard 
deviations higher than that of the control group in the same quartile. Note that in the second 
quartile, the effect on men’s aspirations largely stems from income aspirations and not assets or 
social status. This validates my hypothesis, that the BISP cash transfer will affect the poor 
households. The men within the second income quartile also face financial constraints and BISP 
cash transfer helps them meet their necessities. Yet, it does not improve their aspirations for 
assets of social status. It is promising to see a positive effect of cash transfers on the aspirations 
of the poorest households (lowest two quartile) as it assures a long-term effect of BISP cash 
transfer on the life perceptions, pulling them out of the behavioral poverty trap.  
Next, I check if the impact of BISP cash transfer is larger among the younger population 
compared to older adults. I examine how aspirations vary by age within the first income quartile 
as I divide the sample in two groups, young adults (18-25 years) and working age adults (26-60 
years). Table 9 reports the ATET of BISP cash transfer on the individuals within the first income 
quartile, by gender and age group. It is interesting to see that the magnitude of the impact on 
aspirations index multiplies for women when the sample is restricted to young adults within the 
first quartile. BISP cash transfer boosts their aspirations index by 0.235 units, that is an increase 
of 107 percent on the potential aspirations of the non-beneficiary households, primarily driven by 
income aspirations. On the other hand, for working age women, there is significant effect on the 
assets aspirations that rise by 0.03 units, that is 85.9 percent above the aspirations of the women 
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in the same age bracket and income quartile belonging to non-beneficiary households. It is 
interesting to note that since women are the ones who save and try to make small assets for the 
Table 9: Average Treatment Impact of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of Individuals in First 
Income Quartile, By Age 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A : Women 
I: Young Adults (18-25 Years)     
BISP Beneficiary 0.235* 0.223** -0.023 0.069 
 (0.130) (0.091) (0.041) (0.056) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.077 1.089 -9.746 1.474 
Observations 192 124 183 193 
II:  Working Age Adults ( 26-60 Years) 
BISP Beneficiary 0.063 0.039 0.030* 0.022 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.016) (0.021) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.445 2.846 0.859 0.680 
Observations 871 604 859 873 
Panel B: Men 
I: Young Adults (18-25 Years) 
BISP Beneficiary 0.275** 0.126* 0.047 0.091 
 (0.130) (0.069) (0.030) (0.073) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.165 1.260 0.848 1.243 
Observations 79 75 78 79 
II:  Working Age Adults ( 26-60 Years)     
BISP Beneficiary 0.224*** 0.102** 0.058** 0.062** 
 (0.060) (0.041) (0.023) (0.025) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 10.28 2.020 1.878 14.21 
Observations 428 423 424 427 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
household, especially later in their lives, BISP cash transfer has positive effect of asset 
aspirations of working age women. For men, the results are reported in Table 9, panel B, where 
both young and old adults have improved aspirations compared to the control group. However, 
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the increased aspirations of young men are solely driven by income aspirations while for older 
men it is driven through all three dimensions, income, assets and social status. Therefore, to align 
their actions with their aspirations, young adults from beneficiary households might strive to 
improve their income while older adults will focus on assets collection. 
Thus, unconditional cash transfers have a positive impact on the aspirations of the 
beneficiaries, especially for men. For women, it only effects aspirations index of those within the 
first income quartile with a magnified impact on younger adults (18-25 years) while working-age 
women receiving cash transfer has increased asset aspirations.  
Limitations 
Since there are loopholes in implementation of the BISP cash transfer, it is expected that 
there might be some spillover effect on non-beneficiary households with otherwise similar 
poverty scorecard. To examine the pure treatment effect (or measure the magnitude of spillover 
effects) I analyze the ATET of beneficiary households in treated villages compared to non-
beneficiary households in control villages. Control villages are those villages who do not have a 
single household receiving BISP cash transfer. Since the assignment of control and treatment 
villages is not random, there may be observable or unobservable factors leading to their 
selection. While there are certain community level characteristics such as village’s distance to 
nearest market and city, and village’s distance to post office that I control for, yet there may be 
unobservable factors that may result in villages not receiving cash transfers at all.  
The results are reported in table A4, Appendix A and indicate that largely the 
significance of the results remains the same, however ,the magnitude of the ATET has increased 
for the full sample and men and for women they have significant impact on the asset aspirations 
that were earlier statistically insignificant. This implies there may be some negative spillover 
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effects within the village that dampens the overall treatment effect in my results. Further analysis 
is required to examine the magnitude of spillover effects that is left for future work.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
These results are robust to i) alternative matching methodologies; Inverse Probability 
Weighting, Nearest Neighbor Matching and Propensity Score Matching ii) alternative control 
groups; a) eligible, beneficiary households vs. eligible, non-beneficiary households, b) ineligible, 
beneficiary households vs. ineligible, non-beneficiary households, c) beneficiary households in 
treated18 villages vs. non-beneficiary households in non-treated villages. The results are provided 
in Appendix A. Table A1 gives the results for alternative matching methods indicating that the 
impact of BISP cash transfer is robust to all three variations. Panel A reports the ATET, using 
Inverse Probability Weights, to find the impact of 0.063 units BISP cash transfer on aspirations 
index. Panel B provides results for propensity score matching with one-to-one nearest neighbor 
matching of treated and control households. It finds BISP cash transfers to have a positive impact 
of 0.047 units on the composite aspirations index. Panel C gives the results of propensity score 
matching, finding an impact of 0.053 units. The original results using Inverse Probability 
Weighting with Regression Adjustment are robust to the alternative methodologies of matching 
the control and treatment groups.  
 Further, the findings are robust to alternative control groups for which the results 
are reported in Appendix A, tables A2 and A3. Table A2 reports ATET on the beneficiary, 
eligible households while the control group is taken to be the non-beneficiary, eligible 
households. The impact is positive for the pooled sample and for men, yet statistically 
 
18 Treated villages are those villages where BISP cash transfer is available by some households while control 
villages are those where not a single household is benefiting from BISP cash transfer.  
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insignificant for the sample of women. However, it finds a positive effect on social status 
aspirations of 0.038 units, that is 72 percent higher than that of women from eligible non-
beneficiary households. Table A3 gives the results of ATET on beneficiary, ineligible 
households while the control group is taken to be non-beneficiary, ineligible households. The 
impact on composite aspirations index is robust, yet there is a positive impact on women’s 
income aspiration of beneficiary, ineligible households.  
Hence, it is safe to say that the impact on composite aspirations index is robust to 
alternative control groups, yet the findings about the impact on individual dimensions are 
sensitive to the control groups.  
Conclusion 
While the impact of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) on various welfare indicators 
(education, health, employment, women’s empowerment, saving) is extensively studied, there is 
paucity of work done examining the effect of UCTs on adult’s aspirations regarding their 
income, assets and social status. Aspirations are deemed salient for forward-looking behavior, 
inspiring individuals to proactively make efforts and appropriate investment to change their 
condition in the long run.  
This chapter contribues to the literature of cash transfers by identifying a channel through 
which unconditional cash transfers may have a long-term impact on the beneficiary households.  
Using inverse probability to treatment weighting to construct a counterfactual, and combining it 
with regression adjustment, I show that Benezir Income Support Program (BISP) uncondtional 
cash transfer have a positive impact on the composite aspirations index of adults aged 18+ years 
in rural Pakistan. The data employed is Pakistan Rural Household Survey (2012-2013), collected 
by International Food and Policy Research Institute. Additionally, I demonstrate heterogenous 
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effect by gender and household’s income quartile. The BISP cash transfer only has a significant 
impact on women belonging to the poorest income quartile while for men it is statistically 
significant for their whole sample. Of the women belonging to severely poor households, the 
young women receiving cash transfer aspire for higher income while working age women aspire 
for more assets. Senstivity analysis indicate the results are robust to various matching techniques 
and alternative control groups.  
The findings are particularly relevant to the developing countries, implementing cash 
transfer schemes in their social protection programs and to the international aid organizations. 
The net impact of cash transfer programs may be underestimated unless the benefit of improved 
aspirations are incorporated in it. While the results suggest that cultural and social beliefs may 
result in biased perception of women’s own capabilities, it has not been empirically proven. 
Future work may examine the channels through which unconditional cash transfers effect 
aspirations and why women have a weaker impact.  
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Appendix A 
 
Unconditional Cash Transfers and Aspirations  
Table A1: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of 
adults (18+ years), other Propensity Score Methods. 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Inverse Probability Weights      
BISP Beneficiary 0.063*** 0.038** 0.012** 0.018** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.006) (0.008) 
Observations 6,643 4,973 6,529 6,693 
Panel B: Nearest Neighbor Matching     
BISP Beneficiary 0.047** 0.033 0.016** 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) 
Observations 6,643 4,973 6,529 6,693 
Panel C: Propensity Score Matching     
BISP Beneficiary 0.053*** 0.031 0.014* 0.022* 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.08) (0.013) 
Observations 6,643 4,973 6,529 6,693 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
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Table A2: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of 
adults (18+ years), Beneficiary, Eligible Households Vs. Non-Beneficiary, Eligible Households. 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Full Sample     
BISP Beneficiary 0.049* -0.004 0.021** 0.036** 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.566 -0.159 0.662 1.037 
Observations 1,485 1,187 1,469 1,491 
Panel B: Women      
BISP Beneficiary 0.030 -0.026 0.020 0.038** 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.196 -0.266 0.574 0.715 
Observations 969 677 958 975 
Panel C: Men      
BISP Beneficiary 0.107** 0.020 0.018 0.040 
 (0.053) (0.032) (0.014) (0.024) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.951 0.274 0.871 5.508 
Observations 516 510 511 516 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
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Table A3: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of 
adults (18+ years), Beneficiary, Ineligible Households Vs. Non-Beneficiary, Ineligible 
Households. 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Full Sample     
BISP Beneficiary 0.100** 0.083*** 0.023* 0.023 
 (0.043) (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 2.133 2.038 0.915 3.498 
Observations 1,485 1,176 1,468 1,486 
Panel B: Women      
BISP Beneficiary 0.058 0.021 0.025* 0.025 
 (0.050) (0.030) (0.013) (0.028) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.315 0.229 0.646 0.611 
Observations 977 687 965 978 
Panel C: Men      
BISP Beneficiary 0.171** 0.149*** 0.025 0.031 
 (0.074) (0.056) (0.022) (0.022) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.772 3.446 5.169 0.658 
Observations 508 489 503 508 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
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Table A4: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated of BISP Cash Transfer on Aspirations of 
adults (18+ years), Beneficiary Households in Treated Villages Vs.  Non-Beneficiary 
Households in Control Villages. 
 Composite 
Aspirations 
Index 
(1) 
Normalized 
Income’s 
Aspirations 
(2) 
Normalized 
Assets’ 
Aspirations 
(3) 
Normalized 
Social Status 
Aspirations 
(4) 
Panel A: Full Sample     
BISP Beneficiary 0.102*** 0.065*** 0.032*** 0.011 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.010) (0.020) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.015 1.287 0.807 1.471 
Observations 1,825 1,454 1,804 1,825 
Panel B: Women      
BISP Beneficiary 0.061 -0.004 0.028** 0.028 
 (0.048) (0.026) (0.011) (0.028) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 0.277 -0.048 0.619 0.611 
Observations 1,202 851 1,187 1,202 
Panel C: Men     
BISP Beneficiary 0.159** 0.132*** 0.034** 0.008 
 (0.064) (0.042) (0.016) (0.022) 
Ratio to Control Group Average Outcome 1.034 5.181 1.453 0.243 
Observations 623 603 617 623 
Note: Robust standard errors; *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1: Regression Covariates: Individual Level Characteristics (Age, marital status, Highest level of education attained, 
binary variable for being employed) and Household Characteristics (PMT Score Cards, per adult equivalent 
consumption expenditure, if the household faced no food insecurity in last 30 days) 
2: Treatment Covariates: poverty score card, wealth [house owned, property owned, drinking water source, walls 
construction material (mud/bricks), remittances received], household composition [household size, number of 
children (0-7 years), number of employed household members] and social status indicators (the head’s years of 
schooling and employment status). 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Variables used to Re-construct Proxy Means Test Poverty Scorecard. 
Variables Definition  
Demographics 
Number of Dependents  Number of household members less than 18 years and greater 
than 65 years old.  0-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7+ 
Education 
Household Head’s Education Number of years of education completed by the household head 
No Formal Education 
Class 1-5 (Inclusive) 
Class 6-10 (Inclusive) 
Class 11, college or beyond 
Children Attending School Number of Children, age 5-16 years, in the Household Currently 
attending School Zero children in the household 
All children attend school 
No all children attend school 
None of the children attend school 
House Characteristics 
Rooms per person in the household Calculated the rooms perperson ration by dividing the number 
of rooms with number of household members. 0≤Rooms/Person≤0.2 
0.2<Rooms/Person≤0.3 
0.3<Rooms/Person≤0.4 
0.4<Rooms/Person 
Kind of Toilet Used  
Flush  Flush connected to public sewerage, to a put or to an open drain 
Dry Latrine Dry raised latrine or dry pit latrine 
No toilet No toilet 
Assets 
Owns :Refrigerator/Freezer/Washing 
Machine 
Owns AT LEAST one of the following:  
Refrigerator 
Freezer 
Washing Machine 
Yes 
No 
Owns :Air Conditioner/Air 
Cooler/Geyser/Heater 
Owns AT LEAST one of the following:  
Air Conditioner 
Air Cooler 
Geyser 
Heater 
Yes 
No 
Owns :Cooking stove/ Cooking Range/ 
Microwave Oven 
Owns AT LEAST one of the following:  
Cooking stove 
Cooking Range 
Microwave Oven 
Yes 
No 
Owns and Engine Driven Vehicle Household owns the following engine vehicle? 
One Car/Tractor or One Motorcycle 
No Car/Tractor but One Motorcycle 
Neither Car/Tractor or Motorcycle 
Owns a Television Household owns a Television? 
Yes 
No 
Owns Livestock Household owns the following livestock? 
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One buffalo/bullock OR one 
cow/goat/sheep 
No buffalo/bullock but one 
cow/goat/sheep 
Neither buffalo/bullock nor 
cow/goat/sheep 
Agricultural Land Owned How much agricultural land is owned by the household? 
None 
0<Agricultural Land ≤ 12.5 
12.5<Agricultural Land 
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Aspirations Questions: 
I) Annual income: Annual income is the amount of CASH income you earn from all agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities, and money from BISP or other programs. 
A.1.2 What is the level of personal income you would like to achieve? 
II) Assets: In section A.2, \you" implies \your household." Example of assets are vehicle, 
furniture, tv, cellphone. Please DO NOT include land and livestock, since these questions are 
aimed at non-productive assets (standard of living). 
A.2.2 What is the level of assets that you would like to achieve? 
III) Social Status: On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest level of 
social status one has, answer the following section. 
A.3.2 What is the level of social status that you would like to achieve? 
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